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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43143 
      ) 
v.      ) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2014- 
      ) 20253 
PATRICK JAMES BAILEY,  )  
      ) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Patrick Bailey pled guilty to a single count of lewd 
conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen.  This single count encompassed five 
admitted instances of his sexual contact with his daughter. 
Despite the fact that there is no evidence Mr. Bailey offended against other 
individuals, or that he offended against the victim in this case on more than five 
occasions, the district court appears to have assumed Mr. Bailey did, in fact, commit 
additional crimes.  And, despite the fact that there was uncontradicted expert opinion 
evidence that Mr. Bailey’s crime was “opportunistic” in nature, he is amenable to sex 
offender treatment, and he presents a “moderate-low risk for sexual recidivism,” the 
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district court dismissed the expert’s psychosexual evaluation out-of-hand.  The district 
court then imposed the maximum sentence—life in prison; it ordered that seven years of 
life sentence be fixed.  Later, in response to Mr. Bailey’s motion for a sentence 
reduction pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and after receiving additional information 
concerning the psychosexual evaluation, the district court again rejected that 
psychosexual evaluation out-of-hand.  It also denied Mr. Bailey’s motion. 
On appeal, Mr. Bailey contends the district court made a series of clearly 
erroneous factual findings and abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. Bailey and, later, 
in denying his motion for a sentence reduction.  In response, the State argues primarily 
that none of the court’s findings were clearly erroneous, but also that any erroneous 
findings were harmless, and that the district court in no way abused its discretion.  (See 
Resp. Br., pp.4-8.)   
The purpose of this Reply Brief is to address the State’s arguments concerning 
the district court’s clearly erroneous factual findings. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously detailed in 
Mr. Bailey’s Appellant’ Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein.  
ISSUE 
Did the district court make a series of clearly erroneous factual findings, and abuse its 









The District Court Made A Series Of Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings And Abused Its 
Discretion In Sentencing Mr. Bailey And, Later, In Denying His Motion For A Sentence 
Reduction 
Mr. Bailey contends the district court made a number of errors in this case.  In 
particular, he asserts the district court made a series of erroneous factual findings when 
it sentenced him, and when it later denied his motion for a sentence reduction.  He also 
asserts the district court abused its discretion at both stages—by relying on its clearly 
erroneous factual findings, and by failing to exercise reason with regard to each 
decision.  
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State focuses primarily on the district court’s factual 
findings, arguing that none of the court’s findings were clearly erroneous and, if they 
were, the errors were harmless.  (See Resp. Br., pp.4-7.)  It also argues that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion—either at sentencing or in denying Mr. Bailey’s Rule 
35 motion.  (See Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) 
Below, Mr. Bailey responds to each of the State’s arguments concerning the 
district court’s factual findings. 
 
A. In Sentencing Mr. Bailey And, Later, In Denying His Rule 35 Motion, The District 
Court Made A Series Of Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings 
 
1. The District Court Clearly Erred When It Found—Explicitly During The 
Sentencing Hearing And Implicitly During The Rule 35 Hearing—That 
Mr. Bailey Lied About Passing Out Immediately After The Incident Where 
Ms. Glenn Caught Him Having Sexual Contact With A.R.B. 
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Bailey argued the district court clearly erred in finding 
that he did not pass out after having sexual contact with A.R.B.  (See App. Br., pp.13-
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15.)  This was a fairly significant finding because it supports the inference that 
Mr. Bailey was not very intoxicated when he committed his offense (which would have 
been a mitigating fact had it been found, see, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 
(1982)) and it also allowed the district court to portray Mr. Bailey as a liar (which is 
obviously an aggravating fact). 
In response, the State seeks to defend the district court’s finding by 
mischaracterizing Mr. Bailey’s argument and presenting a misleading picture of the 
evidence in the case.  (See Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)  The State distorts Mr. Bailey’s argument 
in two ways.  First, it characterizes his argument as a “claim that he passed out from 
intoxication . . . .”  (Resp. Br., p.5.)  That characterization is incorrect.  The factual 
finding challenged was only that Mr. Bailey did not pass out (see, e.g., App. Br., p.15 
(“[T]here is no substantial, competent evidence to support the district court’s finding that 
Mr. Bailey did not pass out, and that finding is therefore clearly erroneous.”)), not that he 
passed out due to drunkenness.  Mr. Bailey has already conceded there is conflicting 
evidence as to his level of intoxication.  (See App. Br., p.15.)  However, if the district 
court had correctly found that Mr. Bailey did, in fact, pass out, it could have made a 
better-informed finding as to his level of intoxication. 
Second, the State asserts, “Bailey does not dispute the finding that he was not 
intoxicated.”  (Resp. Br., p.5.)  That is false.  Mr. Bailey made it clear that due to 
conflicting evidence as to his level of intoxication, he has not challenged as clearly 
erroneous the district court’s determination that he was not “extremely intoxicated.”  
(App. Br., p.15 n.12.)  Indeed, it was made clear in his Appellant’s Brief that it is his 
contention that he was intoxicated.  (See App. Br., pp.14-15.)  And, as noted above, had 
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the district court correctly determined that he passed out, it could have made a more 
reliable finding as to his level of intoxication. 
Having mischaracterized Mr. Bailey’s argument in two different ways, the State 
attempts to argue that it is illogical: “Bailey’s claim that the court should have accepted 
his claim that he passed out from intoxication—while simultaneously accepting the 
finding that he was not intoxicated—makes no sense.”  (Resp. Br., p.5.)  However, 
because this argument is not based on the claim Mr. Bailey actually made, it should be 
ignored.  
The State also presents a misleading picture of the facts.  By falsely 
characterizing Mr. Bailey’s argument on appeal as a challenge to the degree to which 
alcohol caused Mr. Bailey to pass out, the State is able to ignore the undisputed fact 
that he did pass out.  As was discussed in Mr. Bailey’s Appellant’s Brief (p.15), 
Ms. Glenn corroborated Mr. Bailey’s contention that he did, in fact, pass out.  She told 
the investigating officer that, “After checking [A.R.B.] out, [Ms. Glenn] went upstairs to 
find Patrick passed out snoring on the bed.  For the majority of the remainder of the day, 
Patrick was mostly sleeping . . . .”  (R., pp.10-11.)  And this is the crux of his argument. 
Because the undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Bailey passed out, the district 
court clearly erred in finding that he did not pass out.  And this is significant because, 
had the district court correctly recognized that Mr. Bailey passed out, it could have 
better evaluated his level of intoxication and, ultimately, his truthfulness. 
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2. The District Court Clearly Erred When It Found—Explicitly During The 
Sentencing Hearing And Implicitly During The Rule 35 Hearing—That 
Mr. Bailey Groomed A.R.B. And Engaged In Predatory Behavior 
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Bailey argued the district court clearly erred in finding 
that Mr. Bailey “groomed” A.R.B. and engaged in “predatory,” as opposed to 
“opportunistic,” behavior.  (See App. Br., pp.15-19.)  In response, the State makes no 
effort to defend the district court’s baseless finding that Mr. Bailey groomed A.R.B., and 
it dismisses the predatory/opportunistic distinction as “entirely semantic.”  (Resp. 
Br., p.5.) 
Because the State evidently concedes the district court clearly erred in its finding 
that Mr. Bailey groomed A.R.B., nothing more need be said on that point.  This Court 
should find the district court clearly erred. 
With regard to the predatory/opportunistic distinction, the State argues that, 
because any sex abuse of a child fits the dictionary definition of “predatory,” the district 
court was not incorrect to have labeled Mr. Bailey’s actions as such.  (Resp. Br., p.5.)  
This argument is without merit because, whatever meaning a layman’s dictionary may 
ascribe to the term “predatory,” in the context of sex abuse cases it has a very specific 
meaning.  As was explained in Mr. Bailey’s Appellant’s Brief, Idaho law used to have a 
very specific definition of “predatory” sexual conduct and, further, the psychosexual 
evaluator, Robert K. Wyatt, MSW, LCSW, who testified at Mr. Bailey’s sentencing 
hearing made the predatory/opportunistic distinction clear.  (See App. Br., pp.15-17 & 
n.13.)  Thus, in the context of this case, the district court clearly erred in labeling 
Mr. Bailey’s conduct “predatory” in the face of uncontradicted evidence showing the 
opposite.   
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3. The District Court Clearly Erred When It Implicitly Found—During Both 
The Sentencing Hearing And The Rule 35 Hearing—That Mr. Bailey Had 
Sexual Contact With A.R.B. More Than Five Times 
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Bailey argued the district court clearly erred in finding 
(i.e., assuming) that Mr. Bailey molested A.R.B. on more than five occasions.  (See 
App. Br., pp.20-21.)  
In response, the State argues that “the district court was well within its bounds to 
conclude” there were additional instances of sexual misconduct.  (Resp. Br., pp.5-6.)  It 
points out that when Mr. Bailey repeatedly confessed to having committed five separate 
acts of sexual misconduct against A.R.B., the details of the incidents varied somewhat.  
(Resp. Br., pp.5-6.)  From this, the State speculates that Mr. Bailey “was not describing 
the same five events,” but rather additional crimes.  (Resp. Br., p.6.) 
Not only is the State’s argument wildly speculative,1 but it is a post hoc 
justification of the district court’s conclusion that does not reflect the district court’s own 
deliberative process.  The district court made it clear that it was simply assuming 
Mr. Bailey sexually offended against A.R.B. more than five times because Mr. Bailey 
could not prove otherwise: 
I think I’ve already mentioned the full disclosure polygraph never talks 
about—never tests to see whether there [were] only five events, and since 
[A.R.B.] can’t talk, I have no way of knowing whether there was more than 
five events.  
. . .   
                                            
1 A more likely explanation is that Mr. Bailey was trying to minimize the details of his 
conduct in one or more of his confessions.  As Mr. Wyatt explained in his report, sexual 
offenders “often attempt to minimize the arousal and sexual behaviors that exist with 
sexual offending.”  (R. Ex., p.67; accord R. Ex., p.75.)  This is obviously something that 
Mr. Wyatt noted and accounted for in offering his opinions in this case.  (See App. 
Br., pp.5-7.) 
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You’ve admitted to five.  There is nothing that would convince me that 
there [were] only five . . .   
(Sent. Tr., p.59, Ls.2-11 (emphasis added).). 
These five events took place over the course of a year and two days . . . .  
I don’t know how you do this time after time after time after time after time 
that you admit to.  I don’t know if there’s more.  We don’t have a psycho—
of a full disclosure polygraph. 
(R.35 Tr., p.55, Ls.9-18 (emphasis added).)  Thus, the district court did not weigh the 
alleged inconsistencies in Mr. Bailey’s confessions and use those inconsistencies to 
speculate as to additional crimes, as the State would now have this Court do; it simply 
assumed that Mr. Bailey offended more than five times.  That assumption was clearly 
erroneous. 
    
4. The District Court Clearly Erred When It Found—Explicitly During The 
Sentencing Hearing And Implicitly During The Rule 35 Hearing—There Is 
No Hope Of Mr. Bailey Being Rehabilitated In Society 
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Bailey argued the district court clearly erred in finding 
that there is no hope of Mr. Bailey being rehabilitated in society.  (App. Br., pp.21-22.) 
In response, the State argues the district court could not have erred in this regard 
because “[d]eterminations regarding rehabilitation and risk of re-offending are not 
factual findings, but are instead opinions on future events.”  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  However, 
the State cites no authority in support of its strange contention that factual findings are 
immune from challenge so long as they are labeled “opinions.”  (See Resp. Br., p.6.)  In 
the law, factual findings are opinions—opinions of the fact-finder.  Cf., e.g., I.R.E. 704 
(“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided the trier of fact.”).  A 
court may not make findings completely contrary to all of the evidence and then 
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immunize those findings from challenge by saying, “but that’s just my opinion.”  If a 
conclusion is not reasonably supported by the evidence, it cannot stand.  And here, 
where the undisputed evidence is that Mr. Bailey can be rehabilitated in the community, 
the district court’s conclusion to the contrary (even if described as an opinion) is clearly 
erroneous. 
 
5. The District Court Clearly Erred When It Found—During Both The 
Sentencing Hearing And The Rule 35 Hearing—That “The Evaluative 
Tools Are Completely Wrong” 
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Bailey argued the district court clearly erred in finding 
that the evaluative tools used by Mr. Wyatt during the psychosexual evaluation “are 
completely wrong.”  (App. Br., pp.22-23.)  The State does not even attempt to address 
this contention.  (See generally Resp. Br.)  Thus, no reply is called for. 
  
6. The District Court’s Clearly Erroneous Findings Were Prejudicial  
The State offers an additional argument—that “[e]ven if Bailey had shown one 
more clearly erroneous factual finding, any error regarding factual findings was 
harmless.”  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  It asserts that Mr. Bailey is merely “quibbling about the 
factual margins of this case” because the district court based its sentence on the 
egregiousness of the offense.  (Resp. Br., p.7.) 
This argument is unavailing.  While a lengthy sentence may ultimately be 
warranted by a particularly egregious offense, that fact does not excuse a sentencing 
court from considering character and circumstances of the offender along with the 
circumstances of the offense in arriving at an appropriate sentence.  See, e.g., I.C.§ 19-
2521(1) (requiring consideration of “the nature and circumstances of the crime and the 
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history, character and condition of the defendant”); State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 835 
(2011) (“The nature of the offense and protection of the public interest are weighed 
against the character of the offender to determine a reasonable sentence.”).  By its 
nature, this balancing cannot occur where the sentencing court is laboring under a host 
of clearly erroneous factual findings. 
  
B. In Sentencing Mr. Bailey, And In Later Denying His Rule 35 Motion, The District 
Abused Its Discretion In Multiple Respects 
Because the State’s brief argument on the question of whether the district court 
abused its discretion is unremarkable (see Resp. Br., pp.7-8), no reply is necessary.  
Mr. Bailey simply asks that this Court find an abuse of the district court’s discretion for 
the reasons set forth in his Appellant’s Brief. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those detailed in his Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Bailey respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
remand his case to the district court with an instruction that it retain jurisdiction.  
Alternatively, Mr. Bailey requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it otherwise 
deems fit. 
 DATED this 15th day of June, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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